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ABSTRACT 
 
SO YOU’RE SORRY? THE ROLE OF REMORSE IN CRIMINAL LAW. 
Rocksheng Zhong, Madelon Baranoski, Neal Feigenson, Larry Davidson, Alec Buchanan, 
and Howard V. Zonana. Law and Psychiatry Division, Department of Psychiatry, Yale 
University, School of Medicine, New Haven, CT. 
 
 The role of remorse in judicial decisions in the criminal justice system has been 
addressed in scholarship and remains controversial. The purpose of this qualitative 
research was to examine the views of seated criminal judges about remorse, its 
assessment, and its relevance in their decision-making. After exemption by the IRB, 23 
judges were interviewed using an open-ended format. Transcriptions of these audio-
recorded sessions were analyzed phenomenologically by members of the research team. 
The results showed that judges varied widely in their views about the assessment of 
remorse and its relevance in judicial decision-making. Judges generally agreed that 
remorse was a valid legal construct. However, they disagreed about which types of 
crimes and at which stage of criminal proceedings remorse was most relevant. They 
further disagreed about the indicators of remorse; behaviors that suggested 
remorsefulness to some judges suggested remorselessness to others. Finally, judges 
differed in their opinions concerning the impact of mental illness on remorse and often 
oversimplified psychiatric disorders. These findings suggest a role for forensic 
psychiatrists as educators and consultants for the courts on the issue of remorse. Greater 
involvement on the part of psychiatrists could promote justice, particularly in forensic 
populations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 Remorse can in some ways be likened to pornography: oftentimes, people do not 
know exactly what it is, but they know it when they see it. This intuitive approach is 
usually adequate in everyday life when stakes are low and rigor is unnecessary. When 
little Timmy says, “I’m sorry,” after knocking over the cookie jar, we generally need not 
explore the psychological depths of his statement. However, in the realm of criminal law, 
the evaluation of remorse takes on greater significance. Remorse has long been held to be 
an appropriate consideration for courts, particularly during the sentencing phase of 
criminal proceedings.1 Despite the acceptance of the legal relevance of remorse in theory, 
legal scholars, as well as those in other disciplines, have had difficulty grasping the 
precise nature of remorse, and courts have applied the concept inconsistently.2 These 
issues are further complicated in individuals with psychiatric illness, whose behavior and 
cognitions may deviate in unexpected ways from those of people without psychiatric 
illness. 
 Remorse is a complex blend of emotion and cognition. Drawing upon both the 
medical and legal literature, as well as novel empirical investigation, this thesis aims to 
offer a clearer picture of judges’ views of remorse, the indicators they use to assess it, and 
their assumptions regarding its expression. This improved understanding will not only 
shed light on the courts’ current treatment of this nebulous concept, but also aid 
psychiatric experts in crafting more effective forensic reports. Finally, the findings 
presented may have implications regarding the fair treatment of offenders with mental 
illness whose experience or expression of remorse may be influenced by their disorder. 
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Definitions of remorse 
 The confusion surrounding remorse begins with its definition. Remorse has been 
explored from a variety of angles. Authors, poets, theologians, psychologists, 
philosophers, and jurists have all attempted to characterize it, with varying results. 
Currently, the Oxford English Dictionary defines remorse as “deep regret or guilt for 
doing something morally wrong.” Moreover, the word carries overtones of biting and 
gnawing; its etymological forebear is the Latin remordēre, which literally means “to bite 
again.”3 Other sources have highlighted additional facets of remorse. For instance, the 
philosopher Thalberg comments that one can feel remorseful only for one’s own actions 
(or omissions) and only when one desires a different outcome than what actually 
occurred.4 Meanwhile, Murphy suggests that an element of atonement—some form of 
restitution or penance—is important to distinguish remorse from regret.5 
 Thus defined, remorse is an ancient concept. Matthew 27:3-5 (New International 
Version) writes that “[w]hen Judas…saw that Jesus was condemned, he was seized with 
remorse…‘I have sinned,’ he said… Then he went away and hanged himself.” 
Shakespeare’s Macbeth presents a similar theme of intense distress followed by self-harm. 
The title character and his wife conspire to murder the King of Scotland and ascend the 
throne. Although they are successful in their plot, they are gradually overcome by the 
burden on their conscience. Macbeth becomes increasingly murderous and paranoid, 
while Lady Macbeth begins to sleepwalk and hallucinate bloodstains on her hands, 
providing one of the Bard’s most famous quotes: “Out, damned spot. Out, I say!”6 
Eventually, she is driven to suicide. 
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 Although these texts help broadly to illustrate some of the central ideas of 
remorse, they hardly articulate a thorough, coherent conception. Indeed, a review of the 
literature reveals a variety of definitions; most are vague, some have different focuses, 
and some even conflict outright with others.2 Recently, Proeve and Tudor have sought to 
combine the wide range of intellectual inquiry concerning remorse into a more precise 
and well-developed characterization of the concept, and I have summarized their 
discussion to create the following formulation: Remorse may be defined as a distressing 
emotion that arises from acceptance of personal responsibility for an act of harm against 
another person. Often, with further reflection, the remorseful individual may desire that 
the act had never occurred at all and wish to make restitution toward the victim.7 
 Several elements of this definition are notable. First, remorse creates discomfort. 
Second, it is a combination of an emotion (the uncomfortable sensation) and the 
cognitions about the circumstances giving rise to that emotion. Third, “acceptance of 
personal responsibility” encompasses not only willful acts of harm, but also harm 
resulting from reckless, negligent, or otherwise unintentional behavior. Fourth, there must 
be an act or active failure to act. The mere thought of causing harm could induce an 
emotion perhaps better characterized as guilt. Finally, the actor must believe that the act 
is morally offensive. Typically, this requires that the victim or victims be one or more 
specific persons rather than a more theoretical group, like “society” as a whole. 
Nevertheless, one might also feel remorseful for having caused harm to non-human 
animals or even inanimate things, such as by destroying a precious object. For the 
purposes of the present research, I will focus primarily on concrete persons.  
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Remorse in legal theory 
 The use of remorse or its absence as a mitigating or aggravating factor during 
criminal sentencing is accepted in both federal and state courts.8,9 Historically, this 
practice arose in the United States from the moral and religious nature of early Puritan 
courts. Defendants, particularly those sentenced to death, were expected to confess and 
repent so that a religious sermon delivered at their public execution could instill 
righteousness among the townsfolk.2 Modern jurisprudential justifications have generally 
been framed in terms of the four standard theories of punishment: deterrence, 
rehabilitation, incapacitation, and retribution.1,7,10 
 Deterrence takes two forms: specific deterrence aims to deter offenders from 
repeating their offenses, while general deterrence aims to deter other potential offenders. 
Deterrence holds that punishment should scale according to the severity of a crime, since 
greater harm justifies a greater barrier in the form of threatened punishment. At the same 
time, punishment should be parsimonious so that offenders do not encounter a situation in 
which they believe no additional punishment is possible (e.g., “I have already killed a 
guard during this bank robbery, so I may as well kill everyone else too.”). Insofar as 
remorse is assumed to be a predictor of reduced recidivism, less punishment may be 
needed to deter the remorseful offender. Conversely, if the absence of remorse is 
assumed to predict increased dangerousness and recidivism, a remorseless individual 
requires additional punishment to accomplish the same degree of deterrence. 
 Rehabilitation views punishment as a means or opportunity to reform an offender 
and reduce or remove that person’s desire or need to commit crimes. Frequently, these 
interventions take the form of medical treatment, therapy or counseling, education, and 
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training programs. As with deterrence, some believe that rehabilitation may be more or 
less readily attained when a defendant is remorseful or remorseless so that corresponding 
levels of (rehabilitative) punishment are warranted. A drunk driver who expresses 
remorse about injuring a pedestrian, for instance, may be more willing to submit to 
treatment for alcohol abuse and driver education than one who is not remorseful. 
 Incapacitation is the most direct manifestation of the broader consequentialist 
principle of minimizing harm: would-be offenders should be prevented from engaging in 
criminal acts by imprisoning them, executing them, or otherwise making it impossible for 
them to offend. In its purest form, incapacitative punishment would not require a criminal 
act to have actually occurred if future criminality were reliably predictable, nor would a 
crime necessarily require punishment if it could be shown that the act was not repeatable. 
Again, for those who claim that the presence or absence of remorse suggests a lower or 
higher likelihood of future crime, less or more incapacitation is needed. For instance, a 
man who expresses remorse after violently assaulting another may need less intensive 
sequestration because his internal distress may be a built-in barrier to attacking others 
again. 
 Finally, retribution, in contrast to the other three theories, argues that punishment 
is not merely an instrument of harm reduction, but an end in itself, a form of just deserts. 
There are two varieties of punishment as retribution, vengeful desert and deontological 
desert. Vengeful desert, also known as lex talionis, is summarized by the phrase “an eye 
for an eye.” Offenders should be punished in a way that reflects the crime, either literally, 
or more commonly today, proportionately to the harm caused. In short, bad acts deserve 
to be punished. Deontological desert, meanwhile, focuses on the moral blameworthiness 
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of the offender rather than the degree of harm of the offense. Bad people (who commit 
bad acts) deserve punishment. While the offense may be part of the assessment of 
blameworthiness, other factors, including state of mind and external conditions, also 
come into play. Thus, a remorseful person may not be as bad as a remorseless person and 
therefore deserves less punishment. 
 Although remorse is theorized to be relevant to all four justifications for 
punishment, its role in the criminal justice system has been challenged. Some contend 
that judges should take neither a defendant’s expression of remorse nor its absence into 
account when determining that person’s punishment. Bagaric and Amarasekara argue that 
the use of remorse in judicial sentencing cannot be justified in terms of either 
consequentialist or retributive theories of punishment.11 They state that deterrence, 
rehabilitation, and incapacitation all require that remorse be associated with future 
behavior but point out that there is currently very little empirical evidence to support that 
assumption. As for retribution, although remorse may be relevant to character-based 
deontological desert, it has little to do with vengeful desert, which focuses on the 
wrongfulness of the act irrespective of the qualities of the actor. 
 Further critiques of the “remorse principle” of punishment highlight the practical 
difficulties of accurately discerning remorse in human expression and differentiating it 
from other emotions. In a series of case studies, Duncan argues that the indicators of 
remorse, and particularly, lack of remorse, that courts use can be readily interpreted in 
ways that have little, if anything, to do with remorse.12 She describes seven children, aged 
9 to 17 years old, who had killed one or more people and whose legal outcomes were 
strongly influenced by their perceived remorselessness. Judges, police, psychologists, and 
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others identified behaviors that included avoidance or denial of the facts, joking remarks 
about killing someone, laughing, silence, an absence of sorrow, peaceful sleep following 
homicide, an impassive facial expression, and apparent sophistication or intelligence in 
plotting a crime. Duncan maintains that each of these behaviors was ambiguous. Denial 
and humor are common defense mechanisms. Silence and an absence of sorrow could 
suggest a reluctance to display emotion publicly. Sleeping at the scene of a crime could 
be seen as an escape from an unpleasant reality or the expression of an unconscious 
desire to be caught. An impassive face may be a mask that does not reflect inner turmoil. 
And a child who can, in a sophisticated and intelligent manner, plot a crime may not 
necessarily possess the same degree of sophistication in moral introspection that would 
be a prerequisite to developing remorse. Moreover, Duncan notes that the role of child 
and adolescent development is often overlooked as a significant confounding factor in the 
expression of remorse because children may lack the social, emotional, and cognitive 
maturity to display remorse in a manner expected by courts. 
 In an expansive review of the legal literature, Ward takes a similar view that 
genuine remorse is nearly impossible to ascertain and that courts’ efforts to take remorse 
into account are doomed to inconsistency at best and unjust rulings at worst.2 Defendants’ 
statements, actions and conduct during the legal process, and conduct prior to and 
following the crime, as well as inferences about defendants’ inner motivations, have all 
been considered even though they are ambiguous, imprecise, and potentially unreliable as 
indicators of remorse. Ward especially objects to courts’ failure to reconcile defendants’ 
Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination with the frequent view that silence or a 
profession of innocence signifies a lack of remorse. Relatedly, Etienne notes that judges 
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may misconstrue zealous challenges to criminal charges, pursuant to the advice of 
defense counsel, as reflecting remorselessness on the defendant’s part.13 And Weisman 
observes that the wrongfully convicted are not only punished for a crime they did not 
commit, but also punished more harshly for failing to be remorseful.14 
 Those who believe that remorse should matter in the administration of criminal 
law acknowledge these weaknesses but emphasize the value of remorse in a social 
relational context. They maintain that remorse is a moral good worthy of civic 
recognition: when a judge alters a punishment on the basis of remorse, she acknowledges 
the offender’s self-conception and honors his autonomy.1 They also suggest that outside 
of the courtroom, the expression of remorse can have powerful reconciliatory healing 
effects for offenders and victims and that these effects can even extend to the community 
at large by reaffirming social norms and morally educating the public.15 
 
Remorse in empirical research 
 Despite the ongoing theoretical debate regarding the role of remorse, the existing 
empirical literature, though limited, generally agrees that remorse, in practice, does have 
an impact on perceptions and judgments about an individual. The Capital Jury Project 
was a multi-state study in which jurors on death penalty cases were randomly chosen to 
be interviewed using a 51-page questionnaire. The data included information about the 
facts of the crime; the handling of the case by defense counsel, prosecution, and judge; 
defendant, victim, and juror demographics; the process of juror deliberation; jurors’ 
perceptions of aggravating and mitigating factors; and jurors’ attitudes about the death 
penalty. Analysis of the South Carolina arm of the study showed that of 17 aggravating 
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and mitigating factors relating to the defendant, failure to express remorse was the third 
most aggravating factor, after prior history of violent crime and future dangerousness. 
When a defendant did not show remorse, almost 40% of jurors were slightly more or 
much more likely to vote for death.16 
 Further analysis of this dataset showed that when jurors believed that the crime 
involved preparation or planning (i.e., “calculated” or “cold-blooded”), they judged the 
defendant to be less remorseful. Conversely, defendants were judged more remorseful 
when their defense claimed that the crime was unintentional, impulsive, an accident, or a 
mistake. During trial, appearing sorry and being sincere and honest were associated with 
remorse, while appearing bored, indifferent, or remote signified an absence of remorse. In 
addition, characterological judgments influenced perceptions of remorse, such that 
individuals who were thought to have loved their families and were therefore good 
people who made bad decisions were believed to have remorse, while defendants who 
were deemed dangerous, having a history of violence and crime, and lacking in basic 
human instincts were believed to have less remorse. Finally, factor analysis and 
multivariate logistic regression revealed that remorse had the greatest impact in 
convincing a jury to impose a life sentence rather than the death penalty only when the 
crime was not extremely vicious. When viciousness was high, remorse did not save the 
defendant from the death penalty.17 Many of these findings were replicated in the 
California arm of the Capital Jury Project.9 
 Remorse has also been found to be important in less serious offenses. One survey 
of over 1,000 American and Canadian drivers asked participants to recall the last time 
they had been pulled over by police for speeding. Their responses to police, speed over 
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the limit, and penalty incurred were recorded. Expression of remorse was shown to be the 
most effective way to decrease the cost of a ticket and was associated with a $34 
reduction.18 
 The effects of remorse have been shown not only in retrospective survey studies, 
but also in controlled experimental psychological research. Numerous studies have 
employed a between-subjects design in which participants are randomly assigned to view 
different versions of the same scenario, one featuring an offender who expresses remorse 
and another featuring an offender who does not. Gold and Weiner, for instance, 
demonstrated that people attributed more positive qualities and were more tolerant of a 
remorseful spy caught divulging sensitive information than a remorseless spy. 
Participants in the remorse condition were significantly more sympathetic toward the spy, 
rated the spy more moral and less likely to recidivate, and suggested more lenient 
punishment.19 Proeve and Howells used a scenario in which a man engaged in sexual 
intercourse with a reluctant woman and was subsequently charged with rape. Participants 
who read the version in which the man showed remorse rather than no strong feelings 
about his actions perceived him to be less likely to have acted similarly in the past, less 
likely to recidivate in the future, and more likely to respond well to treatment.20 Rumsey 
showed that people recommended prison sentences that were four to seven years shorter 
when the narrative indicated that a drunk driver involved in a negligent homicide was 
remorseful rather than not.21 Maclin and colleagues found that participants were more 
likely to return a “manslaughter” instead of a “second-degree murder” verdict when they 
viewed a photo of the defendant’s face that was remorseful instead of angry.22 
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 Other research has had mixed results. In one study asking participants to assess an 
ostensible rapist, although fewer negative personal attributes were ascribed when the 
rapist was remorseful, there was no significant difference in length of recommended 
prison sentence.23 Likewise, another study showed that remorse in a drunk driving case 
was associated with higher ratings of personal responsibility and sensitivity, but there 
was no effect on punishment (monetary fine or prison sentence).24 Indeed, some studies 
have shown that defendants who express remorse are likelier to receive a guilty verdict, 
suggesting that the potential reduction in punishment may come at a cost of increased 
culpability.25 Others have discovered a more complex interaction effect in which a 
remorseful defendant would be deemed less guilty only if participants believed the charge 
to be unfair and overly severe.26 
 Of note, many of these studies touch upon perceptions of remorse and their 
relation to a person’s character and likelihood of rehabilitation or recidivism; they do not 
assess the true predictive value of remorse for either personality traits or future behavior. 
Some studies have shown that remorse is indeed associated with reduced rates of 
recidivism, particularly in juvenile populations, but the data are sparse at this time.27 
 
PURPOSE OF THE INVESTIGATION 
 The complexities of remorse in the law are challenging from both theoretical and 
practical standpoints. Debate continues about the proper role of remorse in mitigation and 
aggravation of criminal sentences. At the same time, jurors, laypersons, and others 
intuitively apply perceptions of remorse when they judge defendants and decide on 
punishments. One notable gap in the literature concerns judges, who not only preside 
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over criminal proceedings but also make the vast majority of sentencing decisions. A 
second notable gap concerns the subgroup of defendants who are afflicted with mental 
illness and are at increased risk of being arrested and sent to jail or prison.28-30 Given that 
psychiatric disorders can alter both the experience and expression of remorse, persons 
with mental illness may be further disadvantaged in this regard. 
 Forensic psychiatrists are frequently asked to assess remorse, either directly or 
indirectly, in criminal cases. Forensic psychiatric evaluations that explore individuals’ 
appreciation of wrongfulness, their insight into their own behavior, or even their 
appreciation of the charges against them often require an exploration of intent and 
reflections regarding the criminal act. During these discussions, offenders may reveal 
aspects of themselves pertaining to remorse that are hidden to other courtroom actors. 
Therefore, forensic psychiatrists are uniquely positioned to provide courts with a fuller 
understanding of the psychology of remorse and the variations in its expression, both in 
general and with respect to persons with mental illness in particular. 
 Thus, the present research aims to address these two lacunae through qualitative 
methods and analysis. Using a series of semi-structured interviews with judges, I present 
judges’ views of remorse: Why and how much should genuine remorse (or its absence) 
affect the outcome of a case? How do judges gauge whether an offender is sincerely 
remorseful? Do judges view someone with mental illness differently with regard to 
remorse? The answers to these questions will be useful for jurists, as well as for 
psychiatric experts tasked with crafting reports for, consulting with, and educating judges 
who seek their help. 
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METHODS 
 Larry Davidson, PhD, an expert in qualitative methodology, consulted with the 
principal investigator and research team on the sampling and conduct of this study. 
Thirty-two of 124 seated judges (26%) in the Connecticut State Superior Court Criminal 
Docket were contacted through email with an explanation of the investigation and a copy 
of the university’s IRB exemption. Twenty-three judges (69%) responded and agreed to 
participate. Participants had between seven and 30 years of experience as seated judges. 
The sample was comprised of 19 men and four women. 
 The recruitment employed “snowball” sampling, in which participants were asked 
to refer other individuals as potential participants.31 Initial recruitment was targeted 
toward judges familiar with the Yale School of Medicine Department of Psychiatry and 
its mission of clinical evaluation, consultation, education, and research. The technique of 
snowball sampling is frequently used in qualitative research for both its logistical 
convenience and methodological advantages. Logistically, direct referrals from peers 
allow researchers to gain access to otherwise insulated populations (such as judges). 
Methodologically, members of a group are often best positioned to identify other 
members who may contribute useful information. Of note, this methodology is not 
hypothesis-driven and does not permit use of quantitative or statistical analyses. The aim 
of such studies is to capture the range of possible responses and generate hypotheses. 
 The interviews were conducted at times and places of participants’ choosing, 
usually in judges’ chambers. Informed consent was obtained before each interview, and 
participants were told that their responses would be audio-recorded and de-identified. 
Interviews ranged in length from 35 to 129 minutes; most lasted approximately one hour. 
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Upon completion, participants were thanked and offered notification of the results. No 
reimbursement or other gratuity was offered.  
 The interview questions were developed in consultation with several legal 
scholars, including a judge, law professor, former prosecutor, and public defender. All 
interviews began with a definition adapted from Proeve and Tudor’s discussion of 
remorse, reiterated here: Remorse may be defined as a distressing emotion that arises 
from acceptance of personal responsibility for an act of harm against another person. 
Often, with further reflection, the remorseful individual may desire that the act had never 
occurred at all and wish to make restitution toward the victim.7 
 Participants were asked whether they agreed with this definition and how they 
would change it. Participants then were asked a series of open-ended questions regarding 
their experiences with remorse in their legal practice, the role remorse plays in court 
cases and the courtroom setting, and how they assessed and used remorse at various 
stages of the legal process. The interview concluded with questions regarding the 
evaluation of genuine versus feigned remorse and the possible effect of mental illness on 
defendants’ ability to experience and express remorse. 
 Interviews were transcribed and analyzed according to the phenomenological 
method.32 This mode of analysis is usually applied to narratives (stories), reorganizing 
and condensing raw text into narrative summaries: coherent accounts of personal 
subjective experience, written in the first person and adapted from respondents’ own 
language.33 Of note, the present research did not seek to understand judges’ experience of 
remorse as a subjective phenomenon per se. That is, summaries were not constructed 
with the singular goal of recounting episodic events; instead, the summaries were 
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organized according to major themes pertaining to remorse. The summarization process 
eliminated excess text and extracted useful meaning from frequently wide-ranging 
interviews. 
 Prior to the analysis phase, the research team received training from the 
methodology expert in the construction of narrative summaries. Then, I and one other 
rater from the team, consisting of a forensic psychiatrist, forensic psychologist, social 
worker, and two law professors, composed narrative summaries of each interview 
transcript. The common methodology training promoted consistency in the procedure of 
narrative summary generation. However, the research team was intentionally comprised 
of scholars from different disciplines to capture a variety of viewpoints and minimize 
rater bias stemming from idiosyncrasies of personal experience or training. The 
summaries were roughly two pages in length (condensed from an average transcript text 
of 14 pages) and provided thematically organized synopses of respondents’ substantive 
views. Once the summaries were completed, the raters met under the direction of the 
methodology expert. This meeting presented a forum for the raters not only to conduct an 
analysis of common themes among interviews, but also to reach consensus regarding 
potential inter-rater inconsistencies. 
 
RESULTS 
 Judges generally concurred with the proposed definition of remorse, with some 
revisions and expansions: remorse is a “blending of emotions and belief or reason” or a 
“fundamental regret for self-accusatory consciousness of guilt”; remorse includes “an 
appreciation of the impact on the victim”; remorse can exist towards others beyond the 
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victim (e.g., the defendant himself, the defendant’s family, and hypothetical victims); and 
a remorseful individual “wishes to modify his or her behavior so that similar acts do not 
occur in the future.” 
 Beyond the initial definition, judges’ views about remorse—and the nature and 
extent of its role in their decision-making—varied greatly. I summarize their divergent 
positions here, grouping them into four broad thematic categories: 
1. The legal relevance of remorse in criminal justice: the extent to which 
remorse or its absence ought to play a role in criminal justice. 
2. The time and place for remorse: the relative importance of remorse or its 
absence with respect to different types of offenses and different stages in the 
criminal justice process. 
3. Expressions of remorse: how judges determine whether defendants are 
expressing remorse and whether those expressions are sincere. 
4. Remorse and mental illness: the relationship between remorse and psychiatric 
issues. 
 
Legal relevance 
 Judges disagreed about whether remorse was legally relevant in criminal justice, 
and responses ranged across the full continuum. As described later in this thesis, judges 
viewed remorse within the legal sequence of events as primarily relevant to the times of 
arraignment and sentencing. Those who viewed remorse as central to the criminal process 
stated: “it is one of the most important things I look for,” it “is a bedrock type of thing,” 
and “I am always looking for it.” Others indicated that remorse was irrelevant: “I do not 
17 
 
 
 
think remorse is, even as a matter of principle, terribly important. The only place where 
remorse really plays a role is at the time of sentencing, and even there, it is not as 
important as other considerations.” 
 Judges further differed about the justifications for taking remorse into account in 
their legal decisions. These discussions were typically couched in terms of the four 
theories of punishment: deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and retribution. One 
judge argued that remorse is relevant to all four approaches: 
 
“Remorse is important because it fits well in terms of the major purposes of 
punishment: retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation. How 
harshly do I have to treat somebody? How badly do I have to beat him up? Less if 
he accepts responsibility, more if he does not. In terms of deterrence, somebody 
who accepts responsibility knows what he did is wrong, wants to make amends, 
probably does not have to be punished for as long or as harshly as somebody who 
does not. With rehabilitation, somebody who is accepting of responsibility has a 
better chance of being able to be rehabilitated. And a person who says, ‘Son of a 
bitch deserved to die,’ is somebody I am probably going to lock up for a long time 
just because he needs to be warehoused, or he will do it again.” 
 
In contrast, another judge stated that remorse was relevant only in terms of retribution, 
stating, “To the degree that you are imposing a sentence strictly as a punitive measure—
that is your primary or only goal—then whether the person is remorseful for his or her 
conduct could affect your decision.” Between these two poles, different judges claimed 
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that remorse was more or less applicable to each theory of punishment. Many did share 
the view that remorse is an indicator of personal character, which in turn predicts future 
behavior and the likelihood for rehabilitation versus recidivism. However, one stated that 
remorse is a poor “counterweight” to the various external pressures that push people 
toward additional criminal activity. One judge stated that the presence of remorse would 
weight his considerations toward the goals of rehabilitation and restitution while the 
absence of remorse would weight his considerations toward deterrence and protection of 
the community.  
 Indeed, the absence of remorse was a significant point of contention. Some judges 
believed that a lack of remorse indicated that a defendant was more dangerous, 
suggestive of sociopathy or increased criminality, more likely to recidivate, and less 
amenable to rehabilitation, all of which warranted harsher punishment. Others held that 
an absence of remorse is routine and expected or is acceptable unless there is 
overwhelming evidence that the defendant is guilty, at which point it would become 
unacceptable. For these judges, a display of remorse justified reduced punishment but a 
lack of remorse did not justify additional punishment, provided the evidence was not 
overwhelming. Still others noted that they would treat an expressionless defendant 
differently than one who actively endorsed his crime; only the latter would be punished 
more harshly. Finally, some judges argued that, on procedural grounds, the absence of 
remorse should never justify additional punishment. Because of the constitutional 
guarantee of due process, defendants must be free to assert their innocence, even in the 
face of a conviction by overwhelming evidence, and a defendant cannot be expected to 
show remorse if he does not even admit the crime. 
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 The judges who did value remorse subscribed to one of three models of 
sentencing, as summarized in Figure 1. In Model A, the presence of remorse results in a 
lower than baseline sentence, but the absence of remorse would have no effect. These 
judges typically invoked the legal principles of due process and a defendant’s right to 
assert innocence. In Model B, the presence and absence of remorse would effect a change 
from baseline in the respective direction—a more lenient sentence with remorse, harsher 
without. Model C is similar to B: the presence of remorse would push a sentence toward 
the lower range, while the lack of remorse would push it toward the more severe end of 
the range, but there would be no predetermined baseline sentence. 
 
Figure 1. Effects of remorse on punishment 
 
 
Judges used one of three models of sentencing: presence of remorse reduces the baseline 
sentence; presence of remorse reduces the baseline sentence and absence of remorse increases the 
baseline sentence; or presence of remorse reduces the sentence while absence of remorse 
increases the sentence with no predetermined baseline. 
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Time and place for remorse 
 Differences in the settings over which judges presided may have contributed to 
the variation in judicial experiences with remorse. For example, judges interviewed at a 
time when they were presiding over trials generally stated that they almost never 
encounter remorse and that defendants who contest their charges are not likely to be 
remorseful: 
 
“While I would certainly like to see remorse, much as I would also like to find 
gold in the street, both are rare events. I virtually never see it because I preside 
over contested trials, where the defendant, by definition, claims that he is not 
guilty, and we give them the presumption of innocence.” 
 
In contrast, judges who oversaw arraignments or sentenced defendants following guilty 
pleas observed remorse “on a day-to-day basis.” 
 Judges’ views varied widely with regard to both the types of crimes whose 
outcomes are most affected by expressions of remorse and the stages in the criminal 
justice process at which they are most likely to take remorse into account. Some judges 
placed greater importance on remorse in more serious cases: “I am always looking for it 
at sentencing in serious cases; I am not looking for it in sentencing just some stupid bar 
fight or something.” And in fact, remorse “could be a 10 or 20% discount off the sentence 
in a violent crime.” Nevertheless, they affirmed that some crimes are so serious and the 
punishments so severe that remorse could not have much of an effect on the sentence: 
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“There are some cases that are so serious that there is not much you can do: 
multiple homicides, multiple rapes. The overwhelming need to protect society 
discounts everything else. If you are convicted of triple homicide, and you are 
remorseful, and you won the Congressional Medal of Honor, I am still going to 
give you 150 years. If you did not win a Medal of Honor, were not remorseful, I 
might give you 180 years. But what is the difference?” 
 
 Other judges stated that leniency stemming from remorse is more meaningful in 
lesser crimes: 
 
“Genuine remorse in a murder case, all that is going to do is shave off a very 
small period of time based upon the fact that the murder controls the remorse. In a 
misdemeanor, genuine remorse can wipe out the whole charge.” 
 
 Many judges pointed out that remorse applied more to crimes involving victims 
rather than victimless crimes, though at least one stated that a defendant even in a 
victimless crime could be remorseful with regard to the effect of the crime on the 
defendant’s own family (e.g., families of drug abusers) or hypothetical victims (e.g., 
police posing as underage girls accepting sexual solicitations on the internet). Crimes of 
negligence, recklessness, and impulsiveness rather than premeditated intent, such as 
drunk driving, accidents, domestic violence, and drug-motivated offenses, were also 
frequently volunteered as examples of cases in which expressions of remorse matter. 
Finally, some judges argued that remorse plays a larger role in property and financial 
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crimes because of the ability to make meaningful restitution; however, other judges 
disagreed, saying that “paying one’s way out of a problem is not necessarily evidence of 
true remorse.” 
 Turning to the particular stages in the criminal justice process at which remorse is 
or is not considered, judges agreed that remorse was generally not a factor during trial. 
Not only would a defendant’s right to maintain her innocence generally preclude displays 
of remorse, but also any expression of remorse would have no bearing on the tasks the 
trial judge must perform, such as ruling on the evidence and instructing the jury. Some 
judges, however, would note the presence or absence of remorse during trial and take it 
into account later during sentencing. A few also mentioned that certain types of defenses 
are more likely to allow a defendant to express remorse during the trial proceedings, and 
in those cases, the judge may take the expression of remorse into account. For example, 
in a self-defense case, the defendant may express remorse over the harm caused while 
still maintaining that he was forced to defend himself because of the circumstances. 
 Judges disagreed about the importance of remorse at other stages of the legal 
process. Some argued that arraignment was, legally, an inappropriate setting in which to 
consider remorse: “Remorse has little impact; arraignment is about setting bail, making 
sure there are grounds to support arrest, and seeing if people qualify for counsel.” 
Remorse “does not factor into most arraignments because of the presumption of 
innocence, the right to remain silent, lack of any real knowledge about the case.” “In fact, 
if a defendant starts to express remorse, I will stop them.” “I am most concerned about 
whether somebody is likely to flee, and is there an immediate risk of committing some 
serious additional crimes.” Thus, in setting bond, “the primary determinants are the 
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severity of the crime and the criminal history of the offender.” Other judges viewed 
arraignment as a time when other psychological and emotional factors were barriers to 
the expression of remorse: “Things are still too raw,” and “you are more likely to see 
regret and crying and emotions, but gauging whether it is remorse is just impossible at 
that stage.” 
 In contrast, other judges regarded remorse as having an impact at arraignment: 
“Remorse has a huge impact on what kind of bond I set, and it plays a bigger role than it 
does almost at any other stage in the procedure, even sentencing, because if you can leave 
somebody out [of jail], and they are going to be capable of staying out of trouble, then the 
chances of going into jail [later on] are lower and lower.” “It affects what bond and what 
conditions of release I set because I am factoring remorse into whether he is going to 
obey my orders to stay away or to not do what he has been doing.” “I might reduce the 
bond or give them a program because remorse gives me a better feel that there is 
something you could work with [in] this person. Maybe you could save or help him 
instead of just locking him up.” 
 There was less variation in the judges’ attitudes about remorse at plea entry. 
Indeed, many identified the type of plea as an indication of remorse or lack thereof. A 
frequent opinion was that a “straight guilty is the best way to indicate remorse.” Judges 
also tended to recognize the legal rationale for entering a plea of nolo contendere (“no 
contest”) in appropriate circumstances (i.e., to minimize subsequent civil liability), such 
as cases of drunk driving resulting in a death, in which it was clear that the aggrieved 
party would bring a civil suit. However, they differed in their interpretation of the Alford 
plea. An Alford plea is a variant of a guilty plea in which a defendant does not admit 
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factual guilt but concedes that the prosecution could likely convince the jury of his 
guilt.34 Some judges argued that like a plea of nolo, the Alford plea “serves its own 
purpose and is not an indicator of the presence or absence of remorse, in and of itself.” 
Rather, “what is being said is that if there is a dispute over certain allegations and that 
instead of taking the matter to trial, the person decides to take the offer.” It is a “tactical 
decision.” But other judges viewed an Alford plea as “the opposite of remorse, a face-
saving mechanism, a calculated way to minimize punishment driven principally by self-
interest but has nothing to do with feeling sorry or regret.” Indeed, an Alford plea 
“undermines real remorse because truly remorseful people do not think like that.” Instead, 
it “shows anti-remorse: ‘Not only didn’t I do it, I am getting screwed, but they can prove 
it.’” One judge wondered, “If they are remorseful, why don’t they agree with the facts?” 
 Sentencing, many judges agreed, “is the Big Kahuna,” “the time when remorse 
comes into play,” and “the best and most evident opportunity for someone to make a 
statement of remorse.” Nevertheless, judges differed in the reported frequency with 
which they encountered remorse. When explaining the manner in which they decided on 
a sentence, many judges noted that they referred to the pre-sentence investigation report 
for additional information regarding the defendant’s remorse or lack thereof: “I give a lot 
of credence to observations [of remorse] made by probation.” Observations made by 
experienced probation officers were deemed especially valuable. Other judges used the 
reports as launching points for their own assessments: “The probation officer says, ‘I 
think this is genuine remorse,’ I might want to try to find out more myself, probe the 
person, try to talk to him, engage him on the record.” Still others recognized the 
limitations of a probation interview—“they are only meeting this person for an hour”—
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and that the usefulness of an officer’s observations depended on “the nature and quality 
of the contact that that officer has with that individual.” These judges preferred either to 
“figure for myself” or to use the report as a way to “reaffirm my impression.” Lastly, one 
judge specified that expressions of remorse are less meaningful when not given in open 
court: “It is one thing to sit across from a probation officer who is preparing a pre-
sentence investigation report and say you are sorry. Can you do it in open court when you 
have to and when the words mean the most?” 
 
Expressions of remorse: “More an art than a science” 
 Judges varied in their level of confidence in assessing remorse, ranging from a 
high degree of confidence to no confidence that genuine remorse can be distinguished 
from feigned remorse. Those confident in their ability often cited their experience: “I do 
not find it difficult to judge remorse. I get people.” “After 40 years of dealing with people, 
it is not hard for me to make a call about remorse. I am pretty good at picking out the 
fakers. I am in the credibility business.” In contrast, other judges emphasized the 
difficulty of determining true remorse: “[The signs of remorse] can all be faked. Go to the 
theatre or the movies—people make a living out of it!” One judge strongly opposed the 
incorporation of remorse in judicial decisions, in part because of the complexity of 
assessing it: 
 
“[Assessment of remorse] is very difficult, especially for judges who are just 
seeing bits and slices when the person appears in these very formalized, stylized 
settings. For judges to think, sitting up on the bench, that they can really figure 
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out whether this guy is remorseful, is remorseful enough, and is it real, it is the 
height of arrogance.” 
 
Many stated that remorse was difficult to evaluate but that a decision was nonetheless 
required: “It is difficult, but you got to read, either wrongly or rightly. Otherwise, you do 
not belong there. Get another job.” 
 In the assessment of remorse, judges disagreed widely with regard to indicators of 
genuine remorse as opposed to insincere remorse or the absence of remorse. Many of the 
behaviors that indicated the presence of remorse to some judges indicated the absence of 
remorse to other judges. The responses can be classified into six categories—statements, 
non-verbal cues, attitude or demeanor, actions or conduct, corroborating sources, and 
gestalt—and judges ascribed varying meanings and degrees of reliability to each. 
 Statements consisted of oral or written communications that indicated a 
“recognition of wrongdoing,” “acceptance of responsibility” (as in “I did it; I am sorry”), 
or articulations of “the beliefs and the understanding of why an act is harmful or in what 
way you’ve really damaged or hurt somebody.” Apologies (letters or direct address in 
court) and empathic statements also fit within this category. Conversely, defendants 
could remain silent, make denials, or endorse their crimes. They could speak in a way 
that “minimizes the consequences to themselves” or suggests that they “do not care about 
the consequences of their actions.” They could blame or threaten the victim, witnesses, 
lawyers, or courtroom personnel. They could lie, reciting “rote remorse” “in the language 
of [their] attorney” as if “looking at a 3 by 5 card in the sky.” One judge stated that 
greater levels of detail were often indicative of greater levels of sincerity, and another 
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claimed that indirect statements (e.g., “I am sorry about what happened”) were less 
sincere than those made in the active voice (e.g., “I am sorry for what I did”). 
 Non-verbal cues were interpretations that judges made of defendants’ behaviors. 
Judges assessed defendants’ emotional states (e.g., being overwhelmed, breaking down, 
not paying attention, being distant) as cues to the presence or absence of remorse. Some 
also looked for specific behaviors, such as crying, facial expression, leering, sneering, 
remaining expressionless, tone of voice, eye contact, lack of eye contact, head hanging, 
putting one’s head down, looking up, looking down, looking around, and fidgeting. 
 Attitude or demeanor—one’s global manner of behavior and address before the 
court—was perceived as an indicator of remorse. Defendants’ respect (or lack thereof) 
for the judicial process and court personnel was often cited: 
 
“Someone stands up straight during the proceedings, speaks respectfully, that 
means one thing. If you are standing with your head at a cocky angle, with a ‘let’s 
get this over with’ look on your face, that will impact me.” 
 
“You come out here before a judge, you want to show that you are a nice person, 
you are remorseful: ‘Yes sir,’ ‘No sir.’ When they come out here, they see people 
and their family in the gallery, they wave like they are a celebrity.” 
 
“If the defendant is looking back to his buddies in the audience and acting up or 
disinterested, that is the kind of body language and lack of remorse that eliminates 
any possibility of a lesser sentence.” 
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 Judges looked with disfavor on what they perceived to be arrogance, narcissism, 
belligerence, hostility, defiance, aggressiveness, and lack of interest or caring: “They will 
stand there with one hand on the hip, looking at you like, ‘Why you are bothering me, 
judge, with these questions?’ That attitude that ‘I can’t be bothered, I have places to go, I 
have things to do.’” In fact, “criminals, especially at the higher level, understand the rules. 
If they are acting out in front of you—negative body language, turning around in their 
chair, speaking out loud, getting aggressive—they are acting out in defiance of the rules.” 
In contrast, a “forthright disposition, calm, cold, cool, and collected” would be consistent 
with a remorseful stance. 
 Actions or conduct referred to behaviors beyond the courtroom that indicated 
remorse or its absence. Judges examined past criminal records and how defendants “live 
their life”; compliance or violation of current court orders; behavior in jail or lockup; 
making restitution; enrollment in treatment for drug, alcohol, or psychiatric problems; 
community service; and volunteering. Two judges exemplified this sentiment with the 
comment, “It is not just talking the talk; it is walking the walk.” 
 Corroborating sources were recognized by some judges as offering useful 
information about remorse. Surrogates, such as family members, significant others, 
clergy, Alcoholics Anonymous or Narcotics Anonymous sponsors, or coaches, were 
mentioned as potentially influencing a judge’s belief or disbelief of a defendant’s claims 
of remorse. 
 Finally, several judges relied on a gestalt impression, described variously as a 
“gut instinct, general feel for people”; “your intuition, your experience, your common 
sense”; a “holistic” approach; “looking at defendants from every possible point of view”; 
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an examination of “all the facts and circumstances”; a “sense from the totality of the 
circumstances”; a “composite of what you say, how you say it, and the attitude you 
exemplify when you say it.”; and “you know it when you see it.” These judges alluded to 
the fact that “it’s more of an art than a science” or that “it’s not a science,” and “there is 
no tool, no radar” that can unerringly discern genuine remorse. 
 Underscoring the lack of any precise, generally agreed-upon method for 
identifying remorse or its absence, judges disagreed about how to interpret some specific 
behaviors. For instance, silence was perceived as an indication of shyness, fear, poor 
public speaking skills, or mental illness on the one hand, or remorselessness, 
disengagement, or distraction on the other. Some judges believed that putting one’s head 
down or hanging one’s head was a sign of respect. Others said that it indicated an 
absence of remorse. Similarly, eye contact or lack thereof could be construed as either 
respectful or disrespectful. Judges had particularly polarized views of letters of apology: 
 
“Being able to put yourself into the victim’s shoes is an important intellectual 
exercise. It is also useful if the offender expresses disappointment or regrets what 
he has done to his own family.” 
 
“I am very big on apologies because it is restorative justice. Particularly in the 
juvenile delinquency setting, I will order defendants to write a sincere letter of 
apology so the victim will know that he has manifested sorrow for what he did. 
That might be of some solace to the victim.” 
 
30 
 
 
 
“I never order a person to write a letter of apology. Why would you ever order 
that? It makes no sense whatsoever. If someone wants to apologize, they 
apologize.” 
 
“Other things that may seem like remorse are not, like letters of apology to 
victims, which can be counterproductive. Those are frowned upon because 
victims find them to be intimidating. Sometimes they can be worded with 
meaning within meaning.” 
 
 Judges also disagreed about how to interpret a defendant’s apparent change of 
heart. Some doubted that the belated expression of remorse was genuine: 
 
“To know whether a person is genuinely remorseful, I think it is really timing. If 
they hang tough through the whole thing, like at a trial, and then when they get 
convicted and all of a sudden they find God, they think that is going to make an 
impression on me.” 
 
Furthermore, “sociopaths can very easily change their demeanor to hopefully get a 
particular outcome.” 
 Other judges, however, believed that people can genuinely reform while awaiting 
disposition, often because their behavior improves with proper management: 
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“People. Can. Change. If somebody has acted like a complete jerk every time he 
has been in front of me and then suddenly changes into this incredibly polite, nice 
man, I have to think he might be acting. But it can also be because they are given 
the right medication, or they have been detoxed from alcohol and drugs, or they 
have had counseling.” 
 
“People can change and that can work to their favor. We frequently see people at 
their very worst, and with the benefit of incarceration, intervention, or treatment, 
they may progress and make an expression of remorse or show an indication of 
reforming their conduct.” 
 
Remorse and mental illness 
 Although one judge professed to have “not the slightest idea” about the nature of 
the relationship between mental illness and remorse, most believed that the presence of 
mental illness essentially altered the consideration and relevance of remorse: “When you 
get into mental illness, it is a whole different ballgame.” “Your ability to be able to put 
yourself in someone else’s shoes is clouded by your mental illness.” “If somebody is 
severely mentally ill, then their thought processes might be skewed, and their judgment, 
ability to understand, and differentiate from reality and non-reality might be impaired.” 
Mental illness “will deeply affect someone’s ability to communicate and may affect their 
whole worldview.” A mentally unstable person is “not even going to be appreciating 
what is going on around them.” Judges tended to view mental illness as a categorical 
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factor—a person was either mentally ill or not—and once mental illness was present, 
neither its type nor its severity influenced their assessments of its effect. 
 Most commonly, judges made statements to the effect that mental illness “almost 
neutralizes” remorse. That is, with regard to defendants with mental illness, judges would 
discount or disregard both the presence and absence of remorse: “I would almost throw 
remorse out the window.” “You take remorse out of the picture.”  “It becomes a non-
issue.” “If mental illness were present and legitimately related to the presence or absence 
of remorse, remorse would be much less of a factor going both ways.” Rather, mental 
illness requires a “whole different” approach, looking “through a different lens,” and 
“changes the dynamics of the analysis” so that it becomes the dominant factor in 
decision-making. The issue of psychiatric medications similarly eclipsed other 
considerations: “I will first ask, ‘What drugs are you on?’ and that is a powerful factor 
that takes precedence over remorse.” “You could be medicated with side effects, in 
zombie-like states.” 
 Those judges that did view remorse as relevant to their decisions regarding a 
defendant with mental illness indicated that they adjusted their expectations: “Expecting 
them to act in a certain way would be unfair; you have to have lesser expectations for 
them to show remorse.” “If a person is so mentally impaired that he or she is incapable of 
expressing remorse, I certainly cannot hold that against an individual.” Nevertheless, if 
remorse were to be expressed, some judges would regard it in the same way as they 
would for a normal individual: “I would not think, by virtue of the mental illness, that the 
expression of remorse was more or less reliable.” “I would not hold their mental illness 
against them if they appeared to be genuine in their expression.” Others, meanwhile, 
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questioned the validity of what appeared to be an expression of remorse by a person with 
mental illness: 
 
“Do they remember what they did? Do they have any real current understanding 
of what happened before to the point where they can honestly show remorse? Or 
is it that they are sorry for what they did and they would not have done it if they 
have been well? I do not know. I do not know whether that is being feigned or if it 
is true because now they are better.” 
 
 Judges also disagreed about whether psychiatrists would be helpful in assessing 
remorse. Some believed that psychiatrists’ training and experience could be effectively 
leveraged in this regard: “Given psychiatrists’ training, they may have a better sense of 
whether expressed remorse is the real McCoy.” These judges credited psychiatrists with a 
heightened ability to detect “real versus unreal” remorse and the “genuineness of 
emotions.” Indeed, psychiatrists “are supposed to have good bullshit detectors,” and 
“they have heard it all.” Furthermore, unlike judges, psychiatrists have an opportunity to 
perform their evaluations “in a different, less confrontational setting.” Therefore, remorse 
“would be a good thing to know about in a psychiatric evaluation” because “remorse 
clearly plays a role in terms of the stuff that a psychiatric evaluator would want,” and “a 
psychiatrist would deem remorse to be a factor in their analysis of someone.”
 Nevertheless, these judges tempered their belief in psychiatry with the 
qualification that “some psychiatrists are very good, some people are mediocre, and some 
people are worth nothing.” 
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“If you just have one of the hired whores, it does not carry any weight. There are 
psychiatrists I have absolutely no respect for at all, and there are other ones that I 
do. And some of them will write anything! Others, you can bank on them.” 
 
 Other judges did not value psychiatrists’ input about remorse. Oftentimes, these 
judges viewed the role of psychiatrists as answering specific questions: “If I get a 
psychiatric report, it is on the question of competency to stand trial, and on that question, 
the presence or absence of remorse would have no bearing.” “In psychiatric evaluation 
reports, I give observations of remorse little or no consideration; I read them for 
background information and psychiatric diagnosis information, but I am not looking for 
remorse.” Other judges in this group doubted whether psychiatrists’ training was of any 
use in determining remorse: “You do not need a professional degree to judge 
remorsefulness; it is more based on experience.” “Having a psychiatrist evaluate whether 
someone is remorseful is not something that would really sway me; you really need to see 
it from someone’s actions and what they say themselves.” Finally, there were judges who 
believed that a psychiatric interview was an inadequate setting for the assessment of 
remorse: “I would be a little uncomfortable with somebody saying, ‘I met this kid for an 
hour and I can tell you, he is really sorry, and it is a deep-seated, sustained remorse.’” “I 
look at expert testimony with a wary eye because they just do not have that much time 
with these people; whether I give weight to psychiatrists’ observations of remorse 
depends on the neutrality of it, the nature of the observations, how long [the observations] 
were, [and] when they were.” 
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DISCUSSION 
 The key finding in this study was that judges did not express uniform views about 
the nature of remorse, its assessment, or its relevance to the judicial process. They also 
disagreed about the effect of mental illness on remorse and whether psychiatrists could 
offer any insight about remorse in people afflicted with psychiatric disorders. These 
numerous discordances manifested most prominently when judges deemed similar 
expressions, mannerisms, or behaviors to have opposite meanings. Considered in 
conjunction with existing critiques regarding remorse, particularly with respect to the 
possible impingement on Fifth Amendment rights that other scholars have described, my 
data cast doubts on the usefulness of how remorse is currently taken into account in the 
criminal justice system. At the same time, it was evident from my interviews that judges 
viewed remorse as a valid and frequently important legal construct. However, confusion 
arose once the issue of mental illness was introduced. Judges exhibited limited familiarity 
with psychiatric disorders and their signs and symptoms, which may lead to 
oversimplifications and misunderstandings. Thus, it appears that defendants with mental 
illness are particularly disadvantaged when it comes to remorse, and consequently, the 
role for forensic psychiatrists and other mental health professionals becomes clear. Given 
the complex interplay that can exist between remorse and mental illness, psychiatrists 
must use their expertise to educate and inform the courts about how a person’s 
psychiatric disorder is affecting his or her thinking and presentation. This type of 
involvement would promote fairness and justice under the law for individuals with 
mental illness. 
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Remorse, character, and punishment 
 With respect to the relevance of remorse in the criminal justice process generally, 
judges drew upon the theories of punishment. Many shared the common intuition that 
remorse or its absence predicts future behavior, so that a remorseful defendant would be 
less dangerous, less likely to recidivate, and more amenable to rehabilitation. In this 
regard, judges’ intuitions about the predictive value of remorse mirrored those of jurors 
and laypersons.16,17,20 Indeed, consistent with other empirical research, judges frequently 
expressed an effort to look beyond the law and the specifics of the crime to determine 
something about the person before them, using remorse as a proxy for overall character.19 
 The evaluation of personal character thereby served as a mediator between 
observed remorse and conferred punishment. Remorseless persons possessed character 
flaws, deserving greater punishment not only to punish the intrinsic immorality of 
remorselessness but also because remorselessness suggested further deficiencies that 
would predispose those persons towards future criminality. Conversely, remorseful 
persons possessed more virtuous character, meriting less punishment by the state. A 
remorseful person was frequently construed as an otherwise normal individual who made 
a mistake and was therefore a candidate for leniency and rehabilitation. In this way, 
remorse contributed to the classification of offenders into (career) criminals versus 
unfortunate everymen. 
 These types of inferences about a person’s fundamental character based on their 
reactions to events are described by affect control theory, which relates emotions, social 
interactions, and identities.35 When a perpetrator reacts remorsefully to an offense in a 
manner that is socially expected, that behavior confirms our assumption that the person’s 
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true identity is essentially good. When a perpetrator reacts without remorse, then the 
behavior disconfirms such an assumption and instead becomes evidence that the person’s 
true identity is essentially evil. Using mathematical path modeling to simulate these 
cognitive processes, Robinson and colleagues showed that people do deduce identity 
from emotional displays of remorse following a drunk driving accident and then use that 
deduction to arrive at sentencing recommendations.36 
 
Discounting procedural constraints on the expression of remorse 
 While it may be unsurprising from a psychological perspective that judges 
intuitively rely on remorse in decision-making, my findings further showed that this 
reliance can be legally problematic. Despite judges’ relative lucidity concerning their 
preference for the good behavior and good character they believed was reflected by 
remorse, surprisingly few mentioned the procedural considerations that may impede 
defendants from expressing remorse. For example, many held that the Alford plea was 
indicative of remorselessness—and such remorselessness might then be taken into 
account in sentencing—even though an Alford plea may be strategic and advised by 
counsel with minimal input from the defendants themselves. Indeed, other important 
legal goals that have nothing to do with a defendant’s willingness to accept responsibility 
are achieved when defendants use the Alford plea, including improved efficiency of time 
and resources, increased freedom of choice in determining legal course of action, reduced 
uncertainty of outcome, and better, more open attorney-client relationships.37  
 That the process of criminal justice can interact with and hinder the expression 
and/or observation of remorse was a recurring theme in my interviews. To begin with, as 
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other scholars have noted, communicating remorse is poor legal strategy and generally 
counseled against because admitting remorse is tantamount to admitting guilt.2 Even 
when defendants wish to reach out to the court or to victims, defense attorneys may 
caution them against making any kind of statement, let alone one that implies culpability. 
Prudent legal practice aside, the mere fact of entering the criminal justice system creates 
practical barriers to proving remorse to the courts. For instance, a defendant who is 
unable to make bail and is jailed will have very few opportunities to make restitution, 
perform community service, or perform other actions that many judges considered 
indicative of remorse. Similarly, in the highly structured setting of the courtroom, 
defendants may not behave as they would in other less formalized venues. Interestingly, 
despite failing to account for all of these factors, judges were able to recognize the 
procedural importance of ignoring remorse during trial. Perhaps the trial, with its 
procedural safeguards, emphasizes in a way that other stages of the criminal justice 
process do not that an individual is innocent until proven guilty. Thus, judges may have 
been able to account more easily for the situational constraints on the expression of 
remorse at trial than they were with regard to those other stages. In contrast, at 
arraignment or sentencing, judges often viewed a lack of remorse unfavorably, setting 
higher bail or harsher sentences, essentially punishing defendants for exercising their 
Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. 
 
Difficulties in identifying remorse 
 Judges in my study determined whether a defendant was genuinely remorseful on 
the basis of particular verbal or non-verbal behaviors, more global impressions, and 
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patterns of conduct, as well as information obtained from other actors. These sources 
were consistent with those found in Weisman’s examination of 127 Canadian criminal 
cases. In that paper, he asserts that courts most frequently used the act of pleading guilty 
as an indicator of remorse, and the earlier the plea, the more likely it would be taken as 
such an indication. Other signs included: conduct following a crime (e.g., returning stolen 
money, calling an ambulance, immediate reactions to police); visible suffering of the 
offender (e.g., being tearful, distraught); and fundamental changes in a defendant’s self or 
personal identity (e.g., experiencing religious conversion, undergoing therapy).38 
 Judges varied in the level of confidence with which they judged remorse; some 
were very confident and others not at all. They also varied in the degree of emphasis they 
placed on certain types of expressions of remorse. But most importantly, they varied in 
how they interpreted those expressions. Certain indicators are obvious: defendants who 
happily endorse their crimes leave little doubt that they are not remorseful. However, 
ambiguous behaviors, such as eye contact (or its absence) and perceived attitude, often 
elicited a range of reactions depending on the judge. In addition, judges also tended to 
view the absence of evidence of remorse as evidence of the absence of remorse. In other 
words, though a few recognized that an expressionless person conveys no information at 
all, many took a failure to endorse remorse as a sign that the person did not experience 
remorse internally. 
 Many judges were sensitive to the uncertainty inherent in judging remorse and 
were curious about whether this study would provide some insight into discerning sincere 
versus insincere remorse. Though the present research will perhaps alert judges to some 
strategies used by their peers that they themselves may not currently employ, my 
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methodology does not permit any inferences about which strategies may be more reliable 
than others. Another recent study more directly addresses this question. Participants were 
asked to describe two events in their lives, one in which they felt intense remorse and 
another in which they felt no remorse. With regard to the latter, participants were asked 
to describe the event and feign remorse. By systematically analyzing facial expressions 
and body language, the experimenters found that false remorse was associated with more 
diverse facial expressions, particularly surprised or angry faces, rather than simply sad 
ones.39 This information may be especially pertinent given that regardless of what people 
consciously say, research suggests that nonverbal rather than verbal cues are given more 
weight in the assessment of remorse.40 
 
Oversimplified views of mental illness and its effects on remorse 
 Against this backdrop of legal challenges and practical difficulties, judges 
struggled to describe the effect of mental illness on judgments of remorse. Judges seemed 
to view the presence of mental illness as requiring an alteration of their usual assessments. 
They were willing to make allowances for mental illness, but their responses suggest a 
categorical view; that is, defendants were either mentally ill or not. If they were mentally 
ill, then they merited a wholly different judicial approach, but if not, then they were 
treated in the usual manner. Few judges indicated that they recognized either a spectrum 
of severity of mental illness or the differences in the types of psychiatric disorders (e.g., 
mood, psychotic, anxiety, personality, autism spectrum, etc.). 
 This lack of nuance is problematic because of the tremendously varied ways in 
which these disorders can manifest. Not only are different diseases associated with 
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different constellations of symptoms, but also two individuals carrying the same 
diagnosis can present dissimilarly. Schizophrenia, for example, may manifest as paranoia, 
disorganization, or intrusive thoughts and hallucinations. Major depression can give rise 
to an increase or a decrease in neurovegetative symptoms. Moreover, schizophrenia and 
depression, though potentially overlapping in some ways, are two entirely different 
classes of illness. Thus, “mental illness” is not an umbrella term that can capture all 
aspects of every psychiatric disorder, much as “theft” would not capture the distinction 
between stealing a pack of bubblegum from a Walmart store and embezzling millions of 
dollars from the Walmart company. Rather, a case-by-case analysis of the particulars of a 
disease is needed. 
 Judges’ views of mental illness informed their beliefs about how to treat 
defendants with mental illness who communicated remorse. Some thought that mental 
illness as a factor in decision-making was so overwhelmingly powerful that all other 
factors fell by the wayside. Others felt that the presence of mental illness called into 
question the authenticity of everything a defendant said, including statements about 
remorse. Still others believed that remorse could be considered with respect to defendants 
with mental illness. Of these judges, some stated that they altered their expectations for 
defendants’ remorse, while others did not alter their expectations. 
 Regardless of the position taken, however, when asked directly, judges generally 
underestimated the ways in which remorse—and the resulting effect on sentencing—
could be affected by a psychiatric disorder. The affective flattening of severe depression 
or psychosis can easily be construed as uncaring and distant (and remorseless), while the 
brash self-confidence of mania can give the impression of arrogance and narcissism (and 
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remorselessness). Persons afflicted with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder may be 
fidgety and easily distracted (and appear remorseless). Those whose delusions cause them 
to believe that they are justified in their crimes may not even experience remorse in the 
first place. And so on. 
 But perhaps the most trouble arises in defendants whose psychiatric disorders are 
undiagnosed or underdiagnosed or who do not wish to be identified as having a 
psychiatric disorder. In those situations, an all-or-nothing representation of mental illness 
may result in misattribution of bad behavior or bizarre cognitions to bad character rather 
than to medical disease or some other external influence. 
 
Implications for forensic psychiatry 
 Currently, unless specifically requested, an assessment of remorse is not regularly 
included in most forensic psychiatric reports. However, my results suggest that remorse 
ought to be addressed more often. Despite the significance many judges place on remorse, 
judicial clarity and consistency remain lacking. Moreover, the courts’ conceptions of 
mental illness are overly rigid. Psychiatrists possess the skills and knowledge necessary 
to supplement judges’ current understanding of remorse in general and in the context of 
mental illness in particular. More informed decisions by courts would then allow for 
more equitable treatment of defendants with mental illness. 
 A psychiatric assessment of remorse would be an extension of current practices, 
in which defendants, over the course of an evaluation, are frequently asked to reflect 
upon their experiences. Psychiatrists are well-equipped to interpret comments about 
remorse. Their training exposes them to a wide range of human expression, and they must 
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often judge truthfulness versus malingering, especially in forensic populations. Critics 
might argue that without an agreed-upon standard by which to assess remorse, 
psychiatrists are no better than judges at making this determination. However, the 
presence of remorse as a Diagnostic and Statistical Manual criterion in the diagnosis of 
antisocial personality disorder implicitly assumes that psychiatrists are able to discern 
remorse at least somewhat reliably, just as they do for other complex emotions and 
attitudes.41 
 Of course, it does not follow that remorse must be included in every report of 
every kind. Nevertheless, forensic psychiatrists should be sensitive to the fact that it is a 
prominent issue for many judges. One might even argue that with respect to sentencing 
and disposition, defendants’ other attitudes about their offenses (e.g., happiness, regret, 
shock, denial, etc.) may be important to judges only insofar as they lend insight into 
defendants’ degree of remorsefulness. 
 Some judges recognized the value of psychiatric consultants, explicitly stating 
that forensic evaluations and testimony would be helpful and welcome in the assessment 
of remorse. At the same time, other judges preferred to rely on their own independent 
assessments of remorse. They perhaps viewed a psychiatrist’s opinion as impinging upon 
a type of personal “ultimate question” and thus beyond the scope of psychiatry. 
 Taken together, these opposing views delineate a role for forensic psychiatrists 
regarding remorse that may be analogous to other types of forensic evaluations. In most 
reports, the evaluator attempts to sway the court, offering professional opinion supported 
by evidence in the form of interview quotes, descriptions of observed behavior, and 
collateral sources. While the psychiatrist may favor one or another position, the ultimate 
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decision lies with the court.42 An assessment of remorse could follow a similar structure 
by describing the defendant’s behaviors and cognitions and offering explanations for how 
those behaviors and cognitions might reflect the presence or absence of remorse. The 
psychiatrist would also comment on whether any concomitant mental illness would 
interfere with or alter the defendant’s experience or expression of remorse. Essentially, 
the report would focus on the phenomenology of the defendant’s remorse while allowing 
the judge to be the final arbiter of whether remorse is truly present. This approach would 
preserve the educational and informational aspect of the consultation without 
overstepping professional bounds.  
 
LIMITATIONS 
 The present research implemented a qualitative interview method that relied on 
snowball sampling. Several methodological limitations were inherent in the study. First, 
the interviews were all conducted by one researcher and thus heavily dependent on his 
interviewing skills and style. Furthermore, interviews, by their nature, rely on reflective 
self-report. Though judges have great experience in detailing their own decision-making 
process, they nonetheless remain vulnerable to the biases of self-report. Namely, they 
could not report unconscious influences, they might be reluctant to divulge inappropriate 
thoughts, their responses were based on memory, and their stated intentions and actions 
may have differed from actual practice. The snowball sampling method also exposed the 
study to bias. When relying on references within an in-group, those with opposing views 
could be systematically overlooked, though I believe the risk is low, given the range of 
responses reported in the Results. In generating narrative summaries, raters were not 
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blind to the study design. Also, the summaries were subject to the particularities of each 
rater. Nevertheless, the research team attempted to minimize this problem by having 
everyone undergo the same training and then meeting together as a group to discuss the 
summaries. Finally, the generalizability of the research may be limited, given that only a 
small sample from one state was obtained. The judges, however, tended to express 
concepts central to criminal law that are likely applicable to a wide range of jurisdictions. 
 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
 The present research was a qualitative study designed to examine the range of 
criminal judges’ views about remorse. I was able to identify a host of behaviors that 
judges deemed important in their assessments. One next step might be to create 
quantitative survey instruments and systematically investigate the degree of agreement 
between judges. Such a study would require a much larger sample of judges, ideally 
taken from a number of jurisdictions. 
 A second avenue of inquiry would be to probe the use of remorse in civil courts, 
where injuries stemming from negligence or recklessness are common; one would expect 
remorse to figure prominently in those situations. Indeed, one study has already shown 
that the timing of defendants’ expressed remorse in mock medical malpractice cases can 
affect the amount of money awarded to plaintiffs.43 Any research on the role of remorse 
in civil cases would have to take into account differences between the civil and criminal 
contexts, such as the role of non-professional juries rather than judges as decision-makers. 
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CONCLUSION 
 Judging people based on their actions, reactions, and emotions is a basic part of 
human nature. Remorse is a universal emotion that people tend to believe provides 
information about a person’s character and likely future actions. Thus, it seems 
commonsensical that judges should assess criminal offenders’ remorse or lack of it in 
sentencing and other judgments. The results of the present research confirm that judges 
are thoughtful about remorse. Most considered it a relevant and even essential factor in 
their decisions about sentencing; most expressed some doubts about their ability to assess 
genuine remorse; and most saw a role for contributions from forensic psychiatric experts, 
especially in the complicated context of mental illness. Unfortunately, given that the use 
of remorse in criminal justice judgments still stands on contested theoretical ground, 
particularly with respect to potential interference with Fifth Amendment rights; given the 
inconsistency with which judges identify and apply remorse in their decisions; and given 
the myriad barriers in legal procedure and in life in general that can block the expression 
or observation of remorse, it is my view that judges ought to  give remorse much less 
weight than they do. At the very least, inferences about the absence of remorse should 
not figure at all into determinations of punishment. But human intuition is difficult to 
stifle, and judgments based on remorse are likely to continue. Until such time as we can 
effectively remove the consideration of remorse from criminal justice decisions, 
psychiatrists and other cognitive science experts are best positioned to inform and 
educate courts and to minimize the errors that are made, especially in cases in which 
mental illness is involved. 
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